COMPARATIVE MODELS OF CRIME PREVENTION AND DELIVERY: THEIR GENESIS, INFLUENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

A seminar of Workpackage 6 of CRIMPREV hosted by the Centre for Criminal Justice at the University of Leeds was held over two days on 7-8 June 2007. This colloquium was the first in the series of meetings of Workpackage 6 ‘Public Policies on Crime Prevention’. The aim of the meeting was to explore the manner in which different models of crime prevention policies, with regard to both strategy and structures for delivery, have developed over the last 25 years or so in differing European countries and to reflect on differences and similarities. In addition to reflections on prior developments within particular countries, the aim was to consider future directions and prospects. In so doing, the metaphor of a journey, as yet incomplete, was deployed as a way of thinking about developmental trajectories and divergent paths taken. Representative from different European countries were asked to
consider and address some or all of the following questions:

- What are the distinctive features of different approaches to crime prevention policies across Europe (and beyond)?
- How have these changed over time? What are the dominant trajectories of development?
- To what extent have crime prevention policies been shaped by institutional infrastructures, constitutional/legal arrangements, political ideologies, economic performance, traditions of welfare and/or cultural differences?
- To what extent has policy diffusion influenced developments?
- How have policies been transformed or reshaped in the process of transfer from one context to another? What factors have influenced that transformation?
- Can we identify a common model or general direction of travel?
- What are the future prospects for, and likely directions of development of, crime prevention policies?

This short summary seeks to synthesise the discussions and the themes that emerged. The programme of the meeting was organised into three parts. The first part entailed a discussion of comparative themes, issues and questions for consideration as well as conceptual lenses through which to consider comparative questions. In this, explicit comparisons were drawn with developments in the field of penal policy. The second part focused on specific experiences and developments within a number of European countries. The final part sought to draw a wider canvas by exploring pan-European and transnational develop - notably through the development and influence of crime prevention networks - and considering the nature of international developments beyond Europe. The aim was to raise comparative questions that might inform and frame country-specific accounts and trajectories of crime prevention developments. In addition it also sought to identify and explore the parameters of policy convergence and divergence and to outline the exogenous and endogenous environments and factors that have shaped policy routes and models.

By necessity, the approach adopted here carries certain very obvious limitations. First, there is an essential bias towards the nation as the unit of analysis. There is a need to be wary of undue emphasis upon national comparisons focus around national level institutions and politics. First, much policy innovation emanates from local or regional levels and may or may not filter ‘upwards’. In addition, the development of crime prevention policies reflects the existence of significant cross-national city-to-city and region-to-region connections, travels and lesson-learning (the Forum for Urban Safety is a good example of city-to-city networks). Furthermore, national poli-
cies are differently implemented, interpreted and translated, influenced by local cultures and traditions. Policies are often resisted, refashioned and played out in different ways. As a result the expectations of central government (in Whitehall, Paris or Stockholm) are modified and given positive and concrete form in different local contexts. This reinforces the importance of not assuming the effectiveness of central government intentions or ambitions, notably those set down in legislation. In federal constitutions, such as Germany and Belgium, where particular legislative authority is devolved to regional structures this is particularly evident but is also apparent in other countries.

I - DRAWING COMPARISONS IN CRIME PREVENTION POLICIES

The (re)emergence of a ‘preventive mentality’ and the ‘ascent’ of crime prevention policies and structures for their delivery, according to some, represents a ‘major shift in paradigm’ in criminal justice and crime control (Tuck, 1988), fundamentally altering the way in which modern societies manage crime and structure social relations. As Garland notes, ‘preventive partnerships’ have become a defining face of contemporary crime control: Over the past two decades... a whole new infrastructure has been assembled at the local level that addresses crime and disorder in a quite different manner... The new infrastructure is strongly oriented towards a set of objectives and priorities - prevention, security, harm-reduction, loss-reduction, fear-reduction - that are quite different from the traditional goals of prosecution, punishment and “criminal justice” (2001, 16-17). This shift was associated with a declining faith in the capacity of the formal criminal justice system to respond adequately to the growth in crime experienced in the post war period and most evidently since the 1960s. The ‘preventive turn’ also reflected a growing acknowledgement of the limited effectiveness of the penal sanction and formal institutions of (state) control. It was also influenced by recognition of the loosening of traditional ties, obligations and commitments and the political and cultural rise of the victim. As faith in the traditional criminal justice establishment - notably the effectiveness of punishment and rehabilitation - began to ebb and wane, researchers, practitioners and policy-makers began to look elsewhere. In this context, the rise of crime prevention policy can be understood as part of an adaptation to an apparent crisis in which high crime rates, with the growth of a consumerist society and a greater abundance of goods vulnerable to theft, became a ‘normal social fact’ in contemporary societies (Garland, 2001).

The contemporary genesis of crime prevention as a focus of public policy first emerged in Europe in the 1970s - as evidenced in early government reports and enquiries notably in France, Sweden, Britain and the Netherlands. This was followed in the 1980s by the beginnings of the institutionalisation of new infrastructures. What marked this period of development was the emergence of a number
of different models of delivery. Whilst something of a caricature the following models became associated with different jurisdictions, during that period:

- The Swedish model became associated with a national strategy which sought to integrate relevant policy domains with a focus on planning, implementation and resources.
- The British model, initially reflected in the Safer Cities projects, became closely associated with a situational approach to the management and modification of the physical environment to reduce opportunities for crime.
- The Dutch model was seen as a more pragmatic blend of strategies involving human agents and technology and with an emphasis on a rigorous research evidence base. In particular this was reflected in the policy that 10% of prevention funding should be allocated to evaluation.
- The Nordic model placed an emphasis on inclusive and non-punitive approaches, with less reliance on technology and a greater reliance on human agents.

Over time other models emerged, including the regional focus of developments in Italy - notably the Region of Emilia-Romagna - and city-level developments often given practical expression through involvement in transnational networks and city-to-city alliances such as the European Forum on Urban Safety. In other jurisdictions, such as Belgium, the influence of models developed within neighbouring countries (in the Netherland and France) produced a complex mixture of approaches in different regions, reflecting different cultural traditions – notably in the separate Flemish and French-speaking parts of the country– and on account of the sway of different political parties. In former Soviet block countries such as Hungary and Slovenia the development of crime prevention strategies and an infrastructure to deliver them has been closely associated with the process of transition. These countries have often seen the rapid development of policies at a national level with less emphasis on robust local delivery mechanisms.

The internationalisation of crime prevention through the development of transnational and supra-national networks has generated a significant flow of prevention policies across countries. Key institutions in this regard include: United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention (UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention); European crime prevention network (EUCPN); European Forum on Urban Safety (EFUS); UN-HABITAT Safer Cities
programme and the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC). These and other institutions have been instrumental in the transfer and diffusion of crime prevention ideas and practices. In so doing, they have added to the more complex picture of mixed models as strategies devised in one country have been appropriated and adapted to a different social and cultural context.

One of the issues that this globalisation of knowledge has brought is a tension between the claims for context specificity in understanding crime prevention and its effectiveness, on the one hand, and the generalisability of different mechanisms across diverse social, economic and cultural situations, on the other hand. For some, the possibilities of international crime prevention offers a ‘scientific’ approach to the question of ‘what works?’ (Farrington, 2000). For others, the generalisations implicit in such an approach over-simplifies the interactive and constitutive relationship between crime, preventive mechanisms and the contexts in which they operate. A valuable insight provided by situational perspectives is that ‘context matters’, as situational prevention privileges a kind of knowledge that is practical, empirical and reflexive, rather than fixed or universal.

II - A EUROPEAN MODEL?

The apparent distinctiveness of specific models, over time, has given way to more mixed and varied approaches. If there is such a thing as a European model of crime prevention it would appear to coalesce around the following elements:

- a focus upon pro-active prevention rather than reactive detection;
- an emphasis upon wider social problems, including broadly defined harms, quality of life, anti-social behaviour and disorder;
- a focus upon modes of informal social control and local normative orders, as well as the manner in which they relate to, and connect with, formal systems of control;
- implementation through decentralised, local arrangements for the delivery of this politics - ‘local problems require local solutions’;
- delivery through a partnership approach, drawing together a variety of organisations and stakeholders, in horizontal networks;
- aimed at producing holistic solutions that are ‘problem-oriented’ rather than defined according to the means or organisations most readily available to solve them.

In a number of countries the language of crime prevention has been replaced by alternate terms that reflect this shift – such as ‘commu-
nity safety’, ‘local safety policies’, ‘quality of life policing’ and ‘urban governance’. A key theme in the institutionalisation and delivery of such policies has been the idea of local - city or regional - safety partnerships or security networks. These variously involve the coordination, of diverse local organisations, actors and interests in multidisciplinary and inter-organisational working relations. These partnerships - which might involve public, private and voluntary sectors - potentially mark a fundamental shift in the way we govern crime and its prevention in that they: recognise that the levers and causes of crime lie far from the traditional reach of the criminal justice system; acknowledge that there is no single agency solution to crime - it is multi-faceted in both its causes and effects; recognise the need for social responses to crime which reflect the nature of the phenomenon itself and its multiple aetiology; potentially allow for an holistic approach to crime, community safety and associated issues which is ‘problem-focused’ rather than ‘bureaucracy-premised’; and potentially afford the potential co-ordination and pooling of expertise, information and resources. In so doing, local safety partnerships challenge many (welfarist) assumptions about professional expertise, specialisation, state paternalism and monopoly and offer a differentiated response that is not segmented or compartmentalised but in theory at least affords a generalised, non-specialist activity, built into the routines and consciousness of all citizens/ organisations.

However, the experiences of all European jurisdictions show that delivering partnerships presents a considerable challenge. Often key agencies have been unwilling to get involved, whilst others have dominated the agendas. Tensions between central government control and local demands and interests have often stymied development such that in some countries the focus of partnerships has been compliance with national agendas or performance indicators, notwithstanding the requirement upon them to identify and pursue local priorities. Despite the rhetoric of localism, devolution and decentralisation, many Governments appear to have been unable and unwilling to adopt a more ‘hands off’ approach to local safety partnerships.

The main barriers to successful partnership include a reluctance of some agencies to participate (especially health, education and social services); the dominance of a policing agenda; unwillingness to share information; conflicting interests, priorities and cultural assumptions on the part of different agencies; local political differences; lack of inter-organizational trust; desire to protect budgets; lack of capacity and expertise; and over-reliance on informal contacts and networks which lapse if key individuals move on. The involvement of the private sector has often been patchy and the role of the voluntary sector is frequently marginalized. Furthermore, public sector bureaucracies have remained resistant to the horizontal ways of working and open-
ing up to engagement with local citizens and other organizations. Hence, the intervening years have shown that realising preventive partnerships has proved stubbornly illusive.

The politics of law and order has also played a significant part in undermining, or at least curtailing, the fortunes of crime prevention policies. A recurring theme from all the experiences of all the countries represented was the manner in which crime prevention policies have been conditioned and influenced by wider political struggles and the alliance of particular strategies with specific political programmes. This is evidenced strongly in the British case with the affinities shared by a situational approach with the neo-liberal politics of Thatcherism and in the connections between Bonnemaison’s emphasis on social crime prevention with the socialist policies of Mitterand. The Dutch punitive turn, with the election of Pym Fortuyn, and the experiences of post-soviet Eastern European countries are further examples.

The political will and leap of faith that a dramatic shift in resources towards prevention demanded never occurred in many countries. Given other more salient or newsworthy political demands, the focus on delivering and embedding prevention has waxed and waned. The enduring sway of ‘punitive populism’ and politicians’ and the media’s continued desire to ‘talk tough on crime’, even against a background of declining aggregate crime rates (in many countries), did not provide a particularly productive environment in which to institutionalise preventive thinking in the state sector, although it has continued to flourish in the business of private security and insurance.

III - IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARING EUROPEAN PENAL POLICIES FOR CRIME PREVENTION

Given the relative novelty of crime prevention as a sphere of public policies and as a field of academic study it is instructive not only to place crime prevention in the context not only of wider shifts in the responsibilities of nation states with regard to managing crime risks and insecurities, but also to consider what might be learnt from comparing penal policies in order to make sense of similarities and differences in comparative crime prevention policies.

Cavadino and Dignan’s (2006a, 2006b) research into comparative penal policies - drawing upon the work of Esping-Andersen - provides some insights into differences (and similarities) in European jurisdictions, which provides valuable analytic tools for considering differences in crime prevention policies. They advance a model which clusters European countries into broad typologies of ‘neo-liberal’, conservative corporatist and social democratic. For the purposes of the study the twelve countries were grouped into four families of political economy: neo-conservative (the USA, Australia, England and Wales, New Zealand and South Africa); conservative corporat-
ist (Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands), social democratic corporatist (Sweden and Finland) and oriental corporatist (Japan).

As can be seen from Table 1, these four ‘family groups’ are differentiated with regard to a range of criteria including their form of economic and welfare state organisation, extent of income and status differentials, degree of protection afforded to social rights, political orientation and degree of social inclusivity. (TABLE 1 - Typology of political economies and their penal tendencies - p 8 -)

These ‘family traits’ also appear to be associated with some striking and enduring differences in penal policy terms. Although the study examined a range of policy indicators including youth justice policy, attitudes towards prison privatisation and also comparative rates of imprisonment we concentrate here on this latter aspect. Table 2 sets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic &amp; penal indices</th>
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<th>Socio-economic &amp; penal indices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neo-liberalism</td>
<td>Conservative corporatism</td>
<td>Social democratic corporatism</td>
<td>Oriental corporatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and social policy organization</td>
<td>Free market, minimalist or residual welfare state</td>
<td>Status-related, moderately generous welfare state</td>
<td>Universalistic, generous welfare state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income differentials</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Pronounced but not extreme</td>
<td>Relatively limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status differentials</td>
<td>Formally egalitarian</td>
<td>Moderately hierarchical, based on traditional occupational rankings</td>
<td>Broadly egalitarian; only limited occupational status differentials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen-state relations</td>
<td>Individualised, atomised, limited social rights</td>
<td>Conditional &amp; moderate social rights</td>
<td>Relatively unconditional &amp; generous social rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>Left-wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisonment rate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archetypal examples</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other examples</td>
<td>England &amp; Wales, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa</td>
<td>France, Italy, Netherlands</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
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out the rates of imprisonment for the 12 countries surveyed by Cavadino and Dignan and suggests a significant association between these different types of political economy and penal severity.

**TABLE 2 - Political economy and imprisonment rates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IMPRISONMENT RATE (per 100,00 population) 2005-2006</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEO-LIBERAL COUNTRIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSERVATIVE CORPORATIST COUNTRIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL DEMOCRACIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ORIENTAL CORPORATISM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Walmsley (2007)*

With only one exception (the Netherlands), all the neo-liberal countries have higher rates than all the conservative corporatist countries; next come the Nordic social democracies, with the single oriental corporatist country (Japan) having the lowest imprisonment rate of all. According to Cavadino and Dignan, what is also noticeable is a general tendency for changes in these countries’ punishment levels over time to fit the same pattern. They suggest that we tend to find that as a society moves in the direction of neo-liberalism, its punishment becomes harsher. The Netherlands, whose imprisonment rate has gone from 17 prisoners per 100,000 population in 1975 to 128 in 2006, is the most dramatic example. Cavadino and Dignan argue that the relationship between severity in the recourse to imprisonment and the type of political economy with which a country is associated, in part, has to do with the cultural attitudes towards deviant and marginalised citizens which are embodied in the political economy.

Such a schema provides an interesting starting point for comparative analysis, although given its breadth and level of generality it suffers inherent limitations. For example, it takes a rather narrow
interpretation of penal severity by focusing on ‘imprisonment rates’ and affords less space for shifts over time (providing a temporally specific snap-shot) and the role of historic and cultural factors. As Lacey (2008) has argued it accords a greater focus on ‘the political’ within political economy - providing less understanding of the role of the labour market and the economy in shaping penal responses. Furthermore, as with any conceptual clustering of ‘families’ there are significant differences within as well as between ‘family’ groups. The most evident example of this is the ‘exceptional case’ of the USA which represents something of an outlier with imprisonment rates on a fundamentally different scale to other ‘neo-liberal’ countries - notably New Zealand, England and Australia which are much closer to ‘conservative corporatist’ countries in this regard.

More fundamentally, crime prevention perhaps fits less well into a simple or dichotomous exclusion/inclusion binary (in a way that is quite different to punishment and penality). Crime prevention can be both exclusionary and inclusionary and at once instrumental and moral. Developmental crime prevention, for example, by targeting those ‘at risk’ can be inclusionary, but also may inadvertently or otherwise stigmatise and engender forms of exclusion. Community-based crime prevention can be at simultaneously inclusive and exclusive: The exclusionary dynamics of ‘defensible space’ theory (Newman 1972) and ‘broken windows’ (Wilson, Kelling, 1982) informed approaches, for example, have been highlighted for some time (Currie 1988). Tim Hope (2000) has well documented the exclusive ‘clubbing effects’ of neighbourhood watch and situational crime prevention against burglary. But these and other community level crime prevention interventions can also foster forms of social capital and collective efficacy (Putnam, 2000; Sampson et al., 1999). Defensive exclusivity can promote forms of bonding social capital between shared interest groups whilst undermining types of bridging social capital between different social groups.

Nevertheless, such conceptual modeling provides some useful insights when thinking about similarities and differences in crime prevention policies across Europe. What then are the potential implications for a comparative analysis of the growth and reception of crime prevention policies? Given the difficulties of quantifying and measuring prevention, we are not able to assess the degree of prevention in the way that penal scholars can compare penal ‘severity’ through imprisonment rates. Table 3 presents one very limited attempt to do so using data from the European Crime and Safety Survey 2005 (van Dijk et al., 2006), which focuses not on state policies but on the reception of prevention on behalf of the public – by way of the percentage of households with a burglar alarm and special door locks. Acknowledging the limitations of the methods of data collection and the manner in which they are influenced by differences in residence type, security and design. As a starting point for comparative analy-
sis one might infer that countries where the proportion of households have burglar alarms is high have more readily embraced situational crime prevention. The UK and Ireland clearly top this group.

TABLE 3 - Crime prevention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Households with a burglar alarm (%)</th>
<th>Households with special door locks (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source van Dijk et al., 2006

Nevertheless, we are able to draw general observations. If neo-liberal societies tend to exclude both those who fail in the economic marketplace and those who fail to abide by the law in line with their highly individualistic social ethos, how does this express itself in crime prevention? Might it suggest more exclusionary preventive strategies, such as those traditionally associated with situational crime prevention? Pat O’Malley (1992, 2001) and others (King, 1991) have persuasively highlighted the ideological and political connections between situational approaches to crime prevention and neo-liberalism. The period of Thatcherism clearly coincided with the considerable expansion of situational technologies in the UK, notably target hardening and the phenomenal expansion of CCTV in the installation of which the UK now leads the world. Moreover, this expansion was directly promoted by central government with an estimated 78% of the Home Office’s crime prevention budget being spent on CCTV systems alone in the mid-1990s in England (Koch, 1998). However, it would be an overstatement to assert that situ-
ational prevention was simply a vehicle through which a Thatcherite ideology about crime was implemented (King, 1991). To do so would be to ignore the wider economic and cultural factors at play. Much of the impetus for situational approaches had its origin far from the reach of governments within the governance of private (or quasi-public) spaces, the growing security market and the insurance industry (Crawford, 2007).

Undoubtedly, situational prevention (re-)emerged at a favourable political moment and was enhanced by its connections with neo-classical (Benthamite) philosophy with its emphasis on the governance of future life choices on the basis of rational calculations of the relative balance between pleasure and pain, reward and risk. Its language of economic reasoning, personal choice, responsibility and rationality fitted very well with the growing neo-liberal consensus within British government. Its appeal to the responsibilities of people and organizations throughout civil society meshed well with the growing political will to downsize and roll-back the state, in order to free-up entrepreneurial initiative. In this context, situational prevention offered the promise of short-term and cost-effective, albeit small-scale, impacts in stark contrast to the ‘nothing works’ pessimism connected with the grand-scale, social engineering projects circulating within criminal justice and penal welfarism. A situational mentality speaks the language of the market, of supply and demand, risk and reward, opportunities and costs, whilst appealing to regulation beyond the state through private and quasi-private auspices. It focuses as much on victims as on offenders. Furthermore, it contrasted with apparently discredited social welfare models of policy provision and resonated with a particular political ideology.

Tim Hope in his contribution to the colloquium provided a detailed analysis of the consequences of situational burglary prevention in the UK through target hardening and sought to assess the extent to which British Government policy had impacted on the subsequent reduction in crime - burglary - since the mid 1990s. His conclusion underscored the important role of the market as well as private and collective initiatives, and as such serves as an important corrective to the usual focus on public policy. Prominent was the effect of the housing market in promoting and retaining security-related benefits. The impact of individual private security consumption is intensified in more affluent areas as a result of which security benefits become residential ‘club-goods’: by internalising the externalities of private security consumption. In conclusion, situational crime prevention appears to have had an impact on burglary rates in Britain despite rather than because of government policy.

Nevertheless, it may be too hasty to interpret the British experience of crime prevention as simply one of situational approaches. The Morgan Report’s advocacy of the term ‘community safety’ deliberately sought to challenge the situational orthodoxy and provides
space for social prevention. Furthermore, research shows that most crime prevention practitioners remain largely wedded to ideas of social prevention in preference to situational approaches (Hughes, 2006). Whilst situational ideas have received a significant reception in the UK, they have had a more uneven impact in other ‘neo-liberal’ societies. They have had comparatively less impact in the USA, notably since ‘defensible space’ and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) concepts fell out of favour in the late 1970s. Whilst Australia and New Zealand have seen considerable acceptance of situational ideas, nevertheless, when the New Zealand government sought to develop a crime prevention strategy in the late 1980s it deliberately looked to the French model with its greater emphasis on social prevention rather than the English approach with its close association with situational prevention (Bradley, Walters, 2002). Furthermore, the different approaches taken in the implementation of crime prevention in Scotland as compared to England and Wales highlight the divergences between otherwise similar jurisdictions.

By contrast social crime prevention policies appear more evident in countries with strong welfare traditions, particularly with regard to youth crime prevention. These countries tend to exhibit less reliance on CCTV, less cooperation with the private sector and fewer coercive early interventions. The Nordic countries are good examples here. The European experience suggests that where broader social approaches to crime prevention have been adopted the boundaries between crime prevention and social policy become blurred. In France, for example crime prevention in the 1990s became subsumed within urban policy, such that it became disconnected from key judicial and criminal justice institutions - most notably the police and prosecutors. There is a converse danger that crime prevention policies infuse social policy to such an extent that they transform the way in which social policies are perceived, valued and justified. In this way, the quality of education, health, environment, housing and social provisions more generally, can come to be viewed in terms of their criminogenic consequences or crime reductive potential, rather than merely as important public goods in their own right. Crime prevention, understood expansively, can influence and distort other public goods to the extent that societies are increasingly ‘governed through crime’ (Simon, 2007).

**In Conclusion**

In reflecting upon the road travelled - thus far - in the development and implementation of crime prevention policies a number of themes of difference and similarity emerged. These included:

- There was some considerable consensus that the distinct models that preoccupied debate in the 1980s were less relevant today. Many countries appeared to have moved towards hybrid
models, with a greater emphasis on pragmatism and evidence-based policy (at least at the level of rhetoric) and less emphasis on ideological fault-lines.

- Many countries in their own developmental trajectories exhibited ambiguous shift and movements which could not be understood in terms of any unilinear trend. The strong influence of politics was evident in the paths taken within many jurisdictions.

- The problem of political ‘hyper-activity’ was identified. There was a sense for some that there had been ‘too much change’ and that many of the initiatives had not been given sufficient time to bed down and produce long-term effects.

- By contrast, there was some evidence, particularly with regard to the prospects of situational crime prevention in Britain, to suggest that the impact on crime and its distribution may have had less to do with public policies or politics narrowly defined and more to do with non-state, market-based, influences.

- There were perceptions that in reflecting on developments, some of the optimism and early aspirations as to the impact of prevention policies on criminal justice systems had not been fully realised. However, some commentators remained optimistic about the future prospect for development.

- There was some agreement that the delivery of holistic partnerships had proved particularly difficult to realise given the departmental boundaries between key organisations and agencies and reluctance on the part of some to participate in joint ventures.

- The place of evaluation and the contentious debates about what ‘counts’ as both success and methodologically robust measure of ‘what works’ was a recurring theme of debate.

It may be that the nation state is not necessarily the most appropriate unit of analysis through which to study comparative crime prevention policies, as it draws attention to the role of national governments rather than local governments and municipal authorities as well as market-based innovations and the role of civil society. City-level developments may provide more nuanced understandings of local differences and the cultural and institutional sensibilities that inform them. Nevertheless, comparing jurisdictions provides a useful starting point in assessing the fortunes and prospects of crime prevention. What is evident is that we need to understand more, rather than less, about the differences and similarities in connections between responses to crime and cultures, as well as the manner in which such strategies derive their sense and meaning from their cultural ties. For, the limits to the transferability of crime prevention and control mechanisms or policies, which advocates may claim to be universal, often derive from precisely such cultural connections.
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